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Abstract—Mobile service providers (MSPs) are particularly vulnerable to roaming frauds, especially ones that exploit the long delay in
the data exchange process of the contemporary roaming management systems, causing multi-billion dollars loss each year. In this
paper, we introduce BlockRoam, a novel blockchain-based roaming management system that provides an efficient data exchange
platform among MSPs and mobile subscribers. Utilizing the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism and smart contracts,
BlockRoam can significantly shorten the information exchanging delay, thereby addressing the roaming fraud problems. Through
intensive analysis, we show that the security and performance of such PoS-based blockchain network can be further enhanced by
incentivizing more users (e.g., subscribers) to participate in the network. Moreover, users in such networks often join stake pools (e.g.,
formed by MSPs) to increase their profits. Therefore, we develop an economic model based on Stackelberg game to jointly maximize
the profits of the network users and the stake pool, thereby encouraging user participation. We also propose an effective method to
guarantee the uniqueness of this game’s equilibrium. The performance evaluations show that the proposed economic model helps the
MSPs to earn additional profits, attracts more investment to the blockchain network, and enhances the network’s security and
performance.
Index Terms—Mobile roaming, fraud prevention, proof-of-stake, Stackelberg game, and blockchain.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
W ITH the popularity of IT technologies and smart de-vices, over 5 billion people have been subscribed to
mobile services, generating a $1.03 trillion revenue globally
in 2018 [1]. Although the number of subscribers and the
revenues will continue to grow, mobile service providers
(MSPs) have been facing several obstacles, especially for
roaming services. Among them, fraud management is one
of the biggest challenges for MSPs with over $32.7 billion
annual loss throughout the world [2]. Roaming fraud ex-
ploits the inefficiency in managing data exchanges between
two MSPs in order to use illegal free-riding services. In
particular, when a subscriber moves from its Home Public
Mobile Network (HPMN) to a Visited Public Mobile Net-
work (VPMN) and remotely accesses services of the HPMN
via the VPMN’s facilities, the HPMN has to pay the VPMN
for the subscriber’s service usage costs incurred according
to the roaming agreement. However, the HPMN may not
be able to charge the subscriber properly due to the delay
in data exchange between the HPMN and VPMN, i.e., the
time interval between when the subscriber finished using
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the service and when the HPMN received the service report
from the VPMN. For example, a subscriber can fraudulently
obtain subscription from the HPMN, e.g., by SIM cloning,
and uses roaming services in the VPMN. Such roaming
fraud can only be detected and responded to after the
HPMN receives the service report, which might take more
than 4 hours.
Recently, the rapid development of blockchain technol-
ogy has enabled blockchain-based applications in various
areas, including Internet-of-Things, healthcare, military, and
service providers. In particular, thanks to its advantages of
low latency and negligible computational requirement, the
PoS consensus mechanism has emerged to be an effective
solution to data management in networks consisting of
devices with limited computational capacity [7]. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose BlockRoam, a PoS blockchain
solution to address the high delay problem in existing
roaming systems.
1.2 Related Work
Typically, a roaming fraud protection system consists of
preventive and reactive layers as illustrated in Fig. 1 [3].
The preventive layer prevents fraud perpetration by val-
idating subscribers’ authentication, auditing subscribers’
credit, limiting services duration, and so on. Although these
measures can help to mitigate roaming frauds, they have a
negative impact on the Quality-of-Service provided to the
subscribers, e.g., frequent validation and service limitation
will lower customer satisfaction. The reactive layer typically
consists of four main stages to detect and react to roam-
ing fraud attacks. The roaming data, e.g., service records,
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2exchanged between MSPs is first collected at the data col-
lection stage and processed at the fraud detection stage to
detect potential fraud cases [3]. Each case is then supervised
manually in the supervision stage. The service usage is
terminated if a fraud attack is confirmed at the response
stage. Among these stages, data collection is often the bot-
tleneck in the roaming fraud protection system. Techniques
employed at this stage can only support data collection in
near real-time with a limited number of subscribers, e.g.,
Fraud Information Gathering System [4], or shorten the data
exchanging delay to 4 hours, e.g., Near Real Time Roaming
Data Exchange [5]. Due to the sequential nature of the
system, other stages cannot be activated if the data has not
been collected. Consequently, although fraud attacks such
as SIM cloning can also perpetrate locally in the HPMN,
their consequences are much more severe in the roaming
scenario due to the delay in data exchange, e.g., it takes
up to 18 hours on average before an international roaming
fraud attack can be stopped with the current system [6].
Preventive layer
Time
Reactive layer
Data 
Collection
Detection Supervision Response
tC tD tS tR
Fig. 1: Illustration of the current fraud protection system.
With outstanding performance in data integrity, decen-
tralization, and privacy-preserving, blockchain has been
emerging to be a secure and effective solution for data
management in many decentralized networks. As a result,
blockchain-based solutions for mobile roaming have been
introduced recently by some organizations, e.g., IBM [8],
Deutsche Telekom and SK Telecom [9], and Enterprise
Ethereum Alliance [10], focusing on identity management,
automating billing processes, and fraud prevention. In par-
ticular, these solutions focus on developing blockchain’s
asymmetric keys and digital signatures to manage sub-
scriber identities and propose smart contracts to set up
roaming pacts and automate billing processes. With en-
hanced identity management and automatic billing, fraud
attacks can be significantly reduced. However, most of these
solutions are still at the early stage of development and are
facing several technical challenges.
Specifically, most of current blockchain-based data man-
agement systems often employ the Proof-of-Work (PoW)
consensus mechanism, e.g., Bitcoin [11]. However, the PoW
mechanism consumes massive amounts of energy, e.g., the
Bitcoin network’s energy consumption is higher than that
of many countries [12]. Moreover, PoW-based networks
often take a long time to reach consensus, e.g. one hour
on average [7]. Thus, a new consensus mechanism, namely
Proof-of-Stake (PoS), has been developed with significant
advantages over the PoW mechanism, including reduced
energy consumption and delay [7]. Recently, a PoS-based
blockchain network, namely Bubbletone [13], has been intro-
duced for MSPs to address roaming fraud problems. Using
the PoS-based consensus mechanism and smart contracts,
the blockchain-based Bubbletone system provides a general
platform for various MSP-to-MSP and MSP-to-subscriber
interactions in the roaming environment. Nevertheless, the
consensus mechanism design is not thoroughly discussed
in [13].
In addition, more users (e.g., mobile subscribers) partic-
ipate in a PoS-based blockchain network means better the
performance and security of the network are. Thus, it is
important to incentivize more users to participate in the
network. In current PoS-based blockchain systems, some
stakes, e.g., network tokens, are paid to the users as a
reward for consensus participation. However, a user with
a few stakes is less likely to receive the reward. Moreover,
some blockchain networks such as [13] impose a high stake
requirement for consensus participation. Consequently, the
stakeholders, i.e., subscribers, are inclined to join a stake
pool (formed by MSPs) to earn more rewards. Furthermore,
a stake pool can earn profits from the investments of the
stakeholders by charging a portion of each stakeholder’s
reward [7]. As a result, the formation of a stake pool can be
beneficial if it can incentivize more subscribers and MSPs
to join the network. Therefore, the design of stake pool
and network parameters has a significant impact on the
performance of a blockchain network, yet studies on this
topic are still limited. The stake pool formation in PoS-based
blockchain networks was analyzed in our previous work
in [7]. However, [7] only considers the investment strategies
of the users while the stake pool’s pricing policy is assumed
to be static. In practice, however, the pool has to design its
pricing policy to maximize the profits while attracting more
investments from the stakeholders.
1.3 Contributions and Paper Organization
The main contributions of this paper are briefly summarized
as follows:
• We propose BlockRoam, an effective blockchain-
based roaming service management system to pro-
vide a transparent, secure, and automatic platform
for data exchanging between the MSPs as shown
in Fig. 2. In particular, by employing the PoS con-
sensus mechanism, BlockRoam can achieve a delay
of fewer than 3 minutes as will be shown later in
Section 3, which is much lower than the 4-hour
delay of traditional roaming management systems.
In addition to the reduced latency, BlockRoam can
automate various roaming processes with the help
of smart contracts [14], and thus roaming frauds can
be significantly reduced. Moreover, the MSPs often
rely on Data Clearing Houses (DCHs) to process and
exchange data, which incurs additional costs [3]. In
our proposed system, the transactions are stored in
the blockchain and processed by smart contracts,
and thus the service fees for DCHs can be elimi-
nated. Furthermore, the privacy and security of the
subscribers in BlockRoam are significantly enhanced
3thanks to the blockchains advanced cryptography
techniques [15].
• We analyze the security performance of BlockRoam
and prove that BlockRoam can meet strict security
requirements of a blockchain-based system with im-
proved reliability. We also show that BlockRoam can
successfully prevent a wide variety of attacks, includ-
ing double-spending, grinding, nothing-at-stakes,
bribe, transaction denial, and long-range attacks.
Moreover, we perform intensive performance anal-
ysis on real blockchain networks to show that the
efficiency of proposed BlockRoam can be further
improved by incentivizing more users to contribute
to the network. This is also the main motivation for
us to develop an economic model for the BlockRoam
system.
• We introduce an economic model based on the Stack-
elberg game theory in order to jointly maximize the
profits of the stake pool and the stakeholders. As a
result, the stakeholders are incentivized to contribute
more to BlockRoam. By analyzing utility functions
of the stake pool and stakeholders, we develop a
Mixed Integer Linear Programming model to find the
Stackelberg equilibrium of our proposed game. We
also propose an effective method that can guarantee
to achieve the unique equilibrium for this game.
The proposed economic approach can help the stake
pool to obtain the optimal pricing policy and the
stakeholders to find the best investment strategies.
• Extensive simulation has been performed to evaluate
the performance of our game theoretic model and the
relations between the stake pool and stakeholders.
We also examine the influence of important parame-
ters on the outcome of the game. The results are es-
pecially crucial in designing appropriate parameters
(e.g., total network stakes, pool fees, and rewards)
for the stake pool to maximize its profit and attract
more stakeholders to the network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We first provide the background about current mobile
roaming systems and blockchain technology and introduce
BlockRoam in Section 2. We then analyze the security and
performance of BlockRoam in Section 3. After that, we
formulate and analyze the stake pool and stakeholders game
in Section 4. Finally, simulations and numerical results are
presented in Section 5, and conclusions are summarized in
Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Current Roaming Systems
The current roaming system is illustrated in Fig. 3 [3]. In the
current system, firstly, a roaming pact is established between
two MSPs. Then, when a subscriber wants to use services
from its HPMN while being in the service area of the
VPMN, the subscriber sends a request to the VPMN. Then,
the VPMN queries the HPMN about the services that the
subscriber has subscribed to. This information is stored in
the Home Location Register (HLR) database of the HPMN.
If the subscription information is correct, the VPMN will
provide the subscriber access to the corresponding services
(e.g., voice or data service) through the Mobile Switch-
ing Center/Visited Location Register (MSC/VLR). The Call
Detail Records (CDRs) are then sent to both networks
where the CDRs are processed for subscription billings
and invoices generation. Afterward, the VPMN sends a
Transfer Account Procedure (TAP) file which contains the
CDR information to the HPMN. Usually, there is a Data
Clearing House (DCH) company acting as a middleman,
which validates and transmits the TAP files for the VPMN.
Once the HPMN receives the TAP files, it will pay the
VPMN in accordance with the roaming pact [3].
Fraud attacks in roaming occur when a subscriber gains
access to the roaming services, but the HPMN is unable
to charge the subscriber for the services provided. In this
case, the HPMN still has to pay the VPNM for the facilities
provided during the roaming process, which may result in
significant financial loss. For example, a fraudulent SIM can
use up to 18 hours of service on average, and in some
incidents, the loss rate is up to e40,000 per hour [6]. The
current roaming system is vulnerable to roaming fraud
attacks mainly because of the delay in data exchanging
between the HPMN and the VPMN. Even with the Near
Real Time Roaming Data Exchange scheme [5], the data
exchange can be delayed up to 4 hours, and thus it may
take a long time to detect and determine the fraud. Even
if the fraud is found, it is still difficult for the HPMN to
response as it does not have direct control over the VPMN’s
facilities [3].
2.2 Blockchain Fundamentals
A blockchain is a sequence (chain) of blocks, where each
block consists of data (transactions) shared among users in
the network. When a transaction is generated by a user, it
will be first verified by miners, i.e., nodes who participate
in the consensus process, to verify the transaction. After
the transaction is verified and added to a new block, the
block will be broadcast to the rest of the nodes in the
network. Based on the distributed consensus mechanism,
a block will be selected from all the blocks proposed by the
miners to append to the chain [15]. Besides the transactions,
a block also contains a hash pointer created by the hash
functions which map all the block contents and the last
block’s pointer to the current block’s pointer. Therefore, any
change in previous blocks will result in a different hash
value in the next one, and it can be traced back to the
first block of the chain. As a result, the whole blockchain
is tamper-evident, i.e., any attempt to alter the previous
blocks can be immediately detected. This is one of the
most crucial advantages of blockchain technology compared
to other security mechanisms. Another advantage is that
a blockchain network is decentralized, and thus there is
no single point of failure, i.e., the network’s operation is
ensured even when some nodes are failed. In contrast, for
the current roaming system, if the DCH is failed, the CDRs
and TAP files cannot be transmitted, and in this case, the
whole system will stop working.
A smart contract is a program stored in the blockchain
network consisting of a set of rules created by users. If the
rules are satisfied, the contract will automatically be en-
forced by the consensus mechanism. The content of a smart
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Fig. 3: Illustration of a typical roaming system [3].
contract is visible to all network users, thus transparency
is ensured [14]. For example, an HPMN and a VPMN can
negotiate with each other and make a smart contract on the
blockchain, which is triggered when a transaction with CDR
data is sent to the smart contract address. Then, when the
transaction is verified and added into the blockchain, all
consensus participants execute the contract code and trigger
the events according to the terms of agreement written in the
contract, e.g., the HPMN automatically pays the VPMN as
per their agreement.
The distributed consensus mechanism is the backbone
of a blockchain network, which governs most of the
blockchain’s operations and ensures that once the data is
stored in a block, it is extremely difficult to be altered
without the consensus of most of the nodes in the net-
work. Currently, most of the blockchain networks have been
employing the PoW consensus mechanisms. In the PoW,
the users compete with each other in a solution searching
procedure where a user with higher computational power
may have higher opportunities to be the block winner who
will add a new block to the chain and receive the reward.
This competition leads to the waste of energy in PoW-based
blockchain networks. Moreover, PoW-based blockchain net-
works often experience high delays in reaching consen-
sus due to security reasons. This makes PoW consensus
mechanisms inappropriate to implement in mobile roaming
systems requiring low delay for fraud prevention.
Unlike the PoW, each block in PoS-based blockchain
networks is dedicated to an authorized participant (leader)
for mining in advance based on stakes of stakeholders in the
network. This mechanism has many advantages over the
PoW, including lower energy consumption and delay, and
thus PoS-based blockchain applications can be employed
effectively in networks with thousands of users [7]. Cur-
rently, there are some variations of PoS mechanisms. Some
of them, such as Ouroboros [16], Casper [17], and Tender-
mint [18], employ a committee of several leaders instead
of a single leader as in Chain-of-Activity [19] and Proof-of-
Activity [20]. There are also several variations of the leader
selection algorithm such as the Follow-the-Satoshi (FTS)
algorithm [16], [17], [18] and the cryptographic sortition
algorithm [21]. In some PoS networks, every new block that
is added to the chain will be voted to confirm immediately,
i.e., immediate finality [18], [21], whereas in other networks,
a block is confirmed after several new blocks are added
to the chain, i.e., delayed finality [16], [17]. To penalize
malicious behaviors, before a new block is created, some PoS
networks [17], [18], [19] require the leader to make a deposit
which is confiscated if the leader behaves maliciously. The
main characteristics, including both advantages and limita-
tions of the considered designs, are summarized in Table 1.
In our proposed blockchain network, we employ a dy-
namic committee selected based on the stake distribution, as
it is more secure than the single leader case. In committee-
based blockchain networks, the committee members are
responsible for the consensus process for a certain period
of time, and thus they are known in advance. Consequently,
there is no advantage in using the cryptographic sortition
over the FTS algorithm. Therefore, we choose the FTS for
the leader selection process. In our proposed system, the
committee members do not vote to confirm each block. This
is because the roaming environment may involve thousands
of users, and thus a low block time, i.e., the time it takes
to add a new block to the chain, is more desirable than a
low confirmation time. To incentivize participation in the
network, a leader can receive the block reward, e.g., a fixed
number of tokens, each time the leader adds a block to the
chain. The leader is also required to make a deposit which
will be confiscated for malicious behaviors.
5TABLE 1: PoS consensus mechanism designs comparison.
Characteristic Advantages Limitations
Committee [16] Several committee members decide More secure than if Longer voting time
seeds and confirm blocks there is no committee
No committee [20] One leader decides block Lower block time Less secure than if
there is a committee
FTS [16] Take seeds as input, None compared to Leader is known
output token index cryptographic sortition in advance
Cryptographic sortition [21] Take seeds and private key as input, Leader cannot be No advantage if
and output token index and proof known in advance there is a committee
Delayed finality [16] Block is confirmed after several Higher block time Higher
blocks deep in the chain confirmation time
Immediate finality [18] Block is confirmed immediately Lower confirmation time Lower block time
by voting
Reward mechanism [16] Block reward for leader Incentivize None
consensus participation
Penalty mechanism [17] Leader has to make deposit which is Mitigate several None
confiscated for malicious behaviors types of attacks
2.3 BlockRoam
2.3.1 Network Model
Our proposed blockchain-based system consists of two main
components, namely the roaming management platform
and the consensus mechanism as illustrated in Fig. 2. The
roaming management platform supports complex interac-
tions between the users, automates various roaming pro-
cesses, and provides a universal currency, i.e., blockchain
network tokens, for payments. In addition to the roaming
processes, the network can also take part in the consensus
mechanism to maintain the network’s operations and secu-
rity, store data (e.g., roaming pacts, subscriber information,
and transaction history), and execute roaming processes
such as payments and processing CDRs.
2.3.2 Roaming Management Procedure
The roaming process, the main procedure of the roaming
management platform, consists of seven main steps as fol-
lows:
• Step 0: Two MSPs form a roaming pact consisting
of tariff plans for services offered to the subscribers
and the payment agreement between two MSPs. This
roaming pact is made in the form of a smart contract
and stored in the blockchain.
• Step 1: When a subscriber (roamer) wants to use
services from its HPMN, the subscriber queries the
VPMN and receives available tariff plans as per
the roaming agreement between the VPMN and the
HPMN.
• Step 2: If the subscriber agrees to use the service, the
subscriber sends a transaction containing a sufficient
amount of money (in form of digital tokens) to the
smart contract’s address.
• Step 3: When the transaction is verified and sent
successfully, the VPMN will grant the subscriber
access to roaming facilities.
• Step 4: When the subscriber finishes its roaming
service, the VPMN sends a transaction to the smart
contract’s address, which consists of the CDR data of
the provided service.
• Step 5: The smart contract then automatically calcu-
lates the subscriber’s service fee and sends it to the
HPMN. The smart contract also triggers a transaction
from the HPMN to the VPMN for payment of the
service.
• Step 6: Finally, the smart contract sends the unused
tokens to the subscriber.
2.3.3 Consensus Mechanism
In our proposed blockchain network, the stake of a user
corresponds to the number of network tokens the user cur-
rently holds. The consensus mechanism employs a dynamic
committee selected based on the stake distribution. Time is
divided into epochs during each of which, the committee
members participate in a 3-phase coin-tossing protocol to
create seeds for the FTS algorithm [16]. Using the seeds
created by the committee, the FTS algorithm selects the
leaders and committee members for the next epoch. The
probability Pi that user i is selected by the FTS algorithm
in a network of N users is
Pi =
si∑N
n=1 sn
, (1)
where si is the number of stakes of user i. This means that
the more stakes a user holds, the higher chance it can be
selected to be the leader. Each epoch is further divided
into slots, and in each slot, a designated leader adds a
new block to the chain. To incentivize participation in the
network, a leader will receive a fixed number of tokens,
when the leader adds a new block to the chain. The leader
is also required to make a deposit that will be locked during
its designated epoch to prevent nothing-at-stake, bribe [7],
and transaction denial attacks [16]. The stakes of committee
6members are also locked during the epoch to prevent long-
range attacks [17].
2.3.4 Benefits
BlockRoam has the following advantages over the tradi-
tional roaming system:
• Roaming fraud prevention: The main obstacle to pre-
vent and react to fraud attacks is the significant delay
in data exchange, i.e., up to 4 hours. Our proposed
system employs the PoS mechanism to speed up the
data exchanging process, e.g., approximately 3 min-
utes on average as later shown in Section 3, and thus
fraud attacks can be detected much earlier. Moreover,
by using smart contracts, the billing process is ex-
ecuted right after the service usage finished. As a
result, roaming fraud can be significantly mitigated.
• Cost saving: In our proposed system, the CDRs are
stored in the blockchain and processed by smart
contracts. Therefore, the DCHs are no longer needed,
and thus the middleman fees are eliminated. More-
over, our system automates various processes, such
as subscribers billing and HPMN payments, which
can further reduce operational costs. Furthermore,
our system’s energy consumption is negligible com-
pared to that of PoW-based systems, and thus our
energy cost is much lower.
• Security and privacy: Using cryptographically secure
mechanisms, the privacy and security of the sub-
scribers can be significantly improved. Each sub-
scriber in the network uses a pair of public and
private keys for identification and verification. The
network only needs the subscriber’s digital signature
which can be easily verified and almost impossible
to forge. This also protects the anonymity of the
subscribers, as the subscriber’s real-life identity is
completely unrelated to the network identity.
3 SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
3.1 Security Analysis
3.1.1 Blockchain Properties
To maintain the blockchain’s operations and security, a
consensus mechanism must satisfy the following proper-
ties [22]:
• Persistence: Once a transaction is confirmed by an
honest user, all other honest users will also confirm
that transaction, and its position is the same for all
honest users.
• Liveness: After a sufficient period of time, a valid
transaction will be confirmed by all honest users.
In our proposed system, persistence ensures that once a
transaction is confirmed, it cannot be reverted. Without
persistence, a fraudster can use the roaming services for free.
For example, a fraudster can perform a double-spending
attack by firstly sending a transaction Tx1 to the smart
contract. Then, after the VPMN has granted the fraudster
access to the roaming service, the fraudster broadcasts a
transaction Tx2 which sends the tokens of Tx1 to another
address (e.g., the fraudster’s second account). If Tx1 has not
been confirmed, Tx2 is still valid and may be confirmed by
honest users.
While the persistence property ensures data immutabil-
ity, the liveness property ensures that every valid trans-
action will eventually be included in the chain. Without
liveness, an attacker might successfully block every trans-
action coming from the MSP, and consequently, the roaming
process cannot commence. It has been proven in [22] that
the persistence and liveness properties are ensured if the
consensus mechanism satisfies the following properties:
• Common prefix (CP) with parameter κ ∈ N: For any
pair of honest users, their versions of the chain C1, C2
must share a common prefix. Specifically, assuming
that C2 is longer than C1, removing κ last blocks of
C1 results in the prefix of C2.
• Chain growth (CG) with parameter ς ∈ N and τ ∈
(0, 1]: A chain possessed by an honest user at time
t + ς will be at least ςτ blocks longer than the chain
it possesses at time t.
• Chain quality (CQ) with parameter l ∈ N and µ ∈
(0, 1]: Consider any part of the chain that has at least
l blocks, the ratio of blocks created by the adversary
is at most 1− µ.
Since our consensus mechanism shares many similarities
with the Ouroboros consensus mechanism [16], we have the
following important parameters:
• Common prefix violation probability PrCP: Let γ be
the proportion of the total network stakes controlled
by honest users. The probability that our consen-
sus mechanism violates the common prefix property
with parameter κ ∈ N over an epoch of ρ slots is no
more than e−Ω(
√
κ)+ln ρ, where the constant hidden
by Ω(.) depends only on γ.
• Chain growth (CG) violation probability PrCG: The
probability that our consensus mechanism violates
the chain growth property with parameters τ, ς over
an epoch of ρ slots is no more than e−Ω(
2ς)+ln ρ.
• Chain quality (CQ) violation probability PrCQ: The
probability that our consensus mechanism violates
the chain quality property with parameters l, µ over
an epoch of ρ slots is no more than e−Ω(
2γl)+ln ρ.
In [16], the bound of PrCP is proven based on the probability
that the adversary can create a fork (i.e., a different version
of the chain) longer than the honest one. However, this is
a conservative approach, because even if the adversary can
create a longer fork, it does not necessarily mean that the
entire honest fork is abandoned. In particular, we will prove
that our consensus mechanism can achieve a new bound of
PrCP based on the following properties:
• A1: An honest user will create exactly one block for
each slot that the user is the leader.
• A2: The list of leaders is known by every honest user
at any time.
• A3: An honest user, when received different forks,
will adopt the longest valid fork, i.e., the longest
fork that has no conflicting blocks and each block
is signed by a designated leader.
7Then, we prove a new bound of PrCP in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose properties A1, A2 and A3 are satisfied, the
probability that BlockRoam’s consensus mechanism violates the
common prefix property with parameter κ ∈ N is less than or
equal to (1− γ)κ.
Proof: Suppose properties A1, A2, and A3 are satis-
fied, any fork created by the adversary must include all the
blocks created by the honest users. This is because if an
honest user does not change its block, then the adversary
can either adopting the block in the fork or replace it by
another block. However, as the list of leaders is known,
the adversary must include the honest block in the fork.
Otherwise, it will create an invalid fork that will be rejected
based on property A3. Moreover, any change in a block’s
content results in a different block’s hash, and the block’s
hash is linked to its previous block. Thus, the part of the
chain from the first block to the latest honest block is
confirmed by every honest user. As a result, the adversary
can only create forks with κ last blocks different from the
honest fork if it is elected leader for κ consecutive blocks.
Since (1 − γ) is the ratio of adversarial stakes in the total
network stakes, the probability that the adversary is elected
leader for κ consecutive blocks is
PrCP = (1− γ)κ, (2)
which is also the probability that the common prefix prop-
erty is violated.
Properties A1 and A3 can be easily satisfied if all the
honest users follow the consensus mechanism. Property A2
can be ensured by conducting the coin-tossing protocol at
the beginning of each epoch, instructing the honest users
to broadcast the leader list of the next epoch during the
current epoch, and requiring an honest user to be online at
least once each epoch (this requirement is reasonable since
an epoch of [16] lasts for 5 days).
3.1.2 Roaming Fraud Protection Ability
To evaluate the roaming fraud protection ability of our
system, we focus on the average resolution time ttotal, i.e.,
the average time between the occurrence of a roaming fraud
attack and the execution of the responses to the attack. As
observed in Fig. 1, ttotal is the sum of every stage’s duration
at the reactive layer, i.e., ttotal = tC + tD+ tS + tR. Since our
proposed system can achieve a much lower tC compared
to the traditional roaming system, i.e., approximately 3
minutes (as later shown in Section 3.2) compared to 4 hours,
the ttotal of our system is nearly 4 hours shorter than that of
the traditional roaming system.
3.1.3 Blockchain Attacks Mitigation
In the following Theorem, we prove that our proposed
BlockRoam can also be able to mitigate and prevent a variety
of emerging blockchain attacks such as double spending,
grinding, bribe, nothing-at-stakes, and long-range attacks.
Theorem 2. BlockRoam can mitigate double-spending, grind-
ing, nothing-at-stakes, bribe, transaction denial, and long-range
attacks as long as the adversary does not control more than 50%
total network stakes.
Proof: In a double-spending attack, the adversary
attempts to revert a transaction by adding a conflicting
transaction to the blockchain after the original transaction is
confirmed. It is straightforward to see that this attack cannot
be successful if the common prefix property is not violated.
In grinding attacks and nothing-at-stake attacks, the ad-
versary creates multiple blocks to influence the seeds of the
leader selection process or revert some blocks in the chain.
More specifically, grinding attacks target the blockchain
where the seeds for leader selection are the previous blocks’
headers. However, the seeds for leader selection are cre-
ated by the committee in BlockRoam, and thus grinding
attacks are mitigated. Moreover, although the adversary
can create forks, nothing-at-stakes attacks do not affect the
network’s security as long as the common prefix property
is not violated. Furthermore, the adversary’s deposit will
be confiscated if the adversary signs different blocks for the
same time slot.
In bribe attacks, the adversary can bribe the leaders
to create specific blocks, e.g., to support other types of
attacks such as double-spending or transaction denial. In the
context of roaming, bribe attacks may cause severe financial
loss. For example, an adversary can perform a bribe attack
to support a transaction denial attack, i.e., bribe the leaders
to not include any transaction made from a certain MSP, and
consequently that MSP cannot process any roaming request.
In this case, the deposits will be confiscated, which signif-
icantly increases the costs of bribe attacks and transaction
denial attacks.
In a long-range attack, a committee member immedi-
ately sells its stakes at the beginning of its designated
epoch, and thus it can behave maliciously for the rest of the
epoch without consequences. Our system can mitigate this
attack by locking committee members’ stakes during their
designated epoch.
When the adversary controls more than 50% of the total
network stakes, both the persistence and liveness properties
are no longer guaranteed [16]. Consequently, attacks such as
double-spending, nothing-at-stakes, and transaction denial
attacks can no longer be mitigated.
3.2 Performance Analysis
In Table 2, we examine and compare the transaction con-
firmation times under different adversarial ratio (percent-
age of stakes in PoS or computational power in PoW
that the adversary controls) of a PoW blockchain network
(Bitcoin), a PoS network with delayed finality (Cardano),
and BlockRoam. The transaction confirmation time is the
time it takes to reach a common prefix violation probability
PrCP ≤ 0.1%. Based on (2), κ can be determined, and then
κ is multiplied with the slot time to calculate the transaction
confirmation time. Our slot time is set to be 20 seconds (the
same as that of Cardano [23]). The transaction confirmation
times of Bitcoin and Cardano are presented in [16].
As observed in Table 2, the more stakes the adversary
controls, the longer the transaction confirmation time is.
Moreover, 51% attack [16] can break most of the PoW-
based and PoS-based blockchain networks. Specifically, an
adversary controlling more than 51% of total computational
power in a PoW-based network or 51% of total stakes in a
8TABLE 2: Transaction confirmation times in minutes
Adversarial ratio Bitcoin Cardano BlockRoam
0.10 50 5 1
0.15 80 8 1.3
0.20 110 12 1.6
0.25 150 18 1.6
0.30 240 31 2
0.35 410 60 2.3
0.40 890 148 2.6
0.45 3400 663 3
PoS-based network can successfully perform many attacks,
including double-spending, nothing-at-stakes, and transac-
tion denial attacks. Therefore, it is critical to attract more
participants to our PoS-based blockchain system in order
to increase the network’s total stakes and prevent the ad-
versary from controlling more than 50% of network stakes.
In the next section, we will introduce an effective economic
model that can jointly maximize profits for the participants,
encouraging them to participate in the network and thus
improving the network’s performance and security.
4 ECONOMIC MODEL
4.1 Stake Pools and Stakeholders
In a PoS-based blockchain network, the probability that an
individual user (stakeholder) with a small number of stakes
is selected to be the leader is low as shown in (1). Moreover,
to participate in the consensus process, a stakeholder must
always be connected to the network, which incurs an opera-
tional cost, e.g., $40 to $300 per month [24]. Therefore, small
stakeholders often pool their stakes together to increase
their opportunities to be leaders and share operational costs,
which results in the formation of stake pools, e.g., [25], [26],
[27]. In BlockRoam, the stakeholders, e.g., the subscribers,
might be more inclined to join the stake pool (e.g., formed
by MSPs) to reduce their operational costs and have more
stable incomes. A stake pool often charges a part of the
stakeholder’s profits for joining the pool, e.g., the Stakecube
pool charges 3% of each reward a stakeholder receives [26].
In this section, we introduce an economic model using
Stackelberg game in order to jointly maximize the profits
of the stake pool and stakeholders, which is beneficial for
MSPs and BlockRoam’s operation and security.
We consider a PoS-based blockchain network with one
stake pool and N stakeholders. The stakeholders have stake
budgetsB = (B1, . . . , BN ) and individual operational costs
C = (C1, . . . , CN ). The stake pool has its own stake σ, and
the pool defines a cost c and a fee α in advance for users who
are interested in participating in the pool. The pool’s cost is
charged for joining the pool and maintaining its operations.
The pool’s fee is the profit margin of the pool’s owner, which
usually ranges from 1% to 9% in real-world stake pools,
e.g., [25], [26], [27]. The stakeholders can use their budgets
to invest pi stakes to the pool and mi stakes for self-mining
(individually participate in the consensus process), such that
pi + mi ≤ Bi. Let denote Np to be the set of stakeholders
who invest in the pool, the probability Pw that the pool is
selected to be the leader and obtains a block reward R is
proportional to the pool’s stakes in the total network stakes,
i.e.,
Pw =
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
. (3)
After receiving the reward R, the pool calculates each
stakeholder’s reward rpi based on the proportion P
p
i of
stakeholder i’s stakes in the total stakes of the pool, which
is
P pi =
pi
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn
. (4)
The pool then charges a fee for α percentage from each
stakeholder’s reward and a cost of ce−pi before the reward
is finally sent to each stakeholder. Since the cost decreases
exponentially as the stakes increase, it encourages the stake-
holders to invest more stakes to the pool. Thus, when a
stakeholder i invests pi stakes to the pool, the stakeholder’s
expected reward rpi is given by
rpi = P
wP pi (1− α)R− ce−pi ,
=
pi
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
(1− α)R− ce−pi . (5)
In the case if the stakeholder i uses mi stakes to self-
mine, its expected reward is
rmi =
(
mi
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
)
R− Ci, (6)
where
mi
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
represents the proportion
of stakeholder i’s stakes in the total network stakes. Then,
the profit of the pool can be calculated as follows:
Up =
σ
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R
+
∑
i∈Np
(
piα
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R+ ce−pi
)
.
(7)
The total profit of the pool consists of the profits from its
own stakes, i.e., the first term in (7), and the costs and fees
it charges the stakeholders, i.e., the second term in (7).
4.2 Stackelberg Game Formulation
In practice, a pool usually announces its cost and fee first,
e.g., the fee to join the Stakecube pool can be found on its
website [26]. Based on that information, the stakeholders
will decide how much to invest. As a result, the interaction
between the stake pool and stakeholders can be formu-
lated to be a single-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg
game [28]. In this game, the leader is the stake pool who
first announces its strategy, i.e., costs and fees to join the
pool, and then the stakeholders, i.e., followers, will make
their decisions, e.g., to invest to the pool or not.
We denote sp and si to be the strategies of the leader
and follower i, respectively. Furthermore, we denote Si to
be the set of all possible strategies of follower i. Then, the
best response s∗i of a follower i can be defined to be the
strategy set which gives the follower the best payoff given a
fixed strategy sp = (α, c) of the leader, i.e.,
Ui(s
∗
i , sp) ≥ Ui(s′i, sp),∀s′i ∈ Si. (8)
9Based on the follower’s best response, the Stackelberg strat-
egy for the leader is a strategy s∗p such that
s∗p = argmax
sp
Up(sp, s
∗
i ). (9)
Then, the Stackelberg solution can be defined as the tuple
(s∗p, s
∗
i ), and its corresponding utility tuple (U
∗
p , U
∗
i ) is the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. To find the Stackelberg
equilibrium, the game can be divided into two stages. At
the first stage, the leader announces its strategy. Then, at the
second stage, the followers determine their strategies based
on the leader’s strategy. In the following, the backward-
induction-based analysis is carried out to examine the Stack-
elberg equilibrium of this game.
4.2.1 Follower strategy
In this game, a follower’s possible strategies can be divided
into four cases:
• Case 1: Only invest stakes to the pool.
• Case 2: Only invest stakes for self-mining.
• Case 3: Simultaneously invest stakes to the pool and
for self-mining.
• Case 4: Do not invest stakes to the PoS-based
blockchain network.
In Case 1 and 2, although the follower can invest using any
number of stakes within its budget, we prove in Lemma 1
that a rational follower will always invest all its budget.
Lemma 1. Let s′i denote a strategy where follower i invests less
than its total budget, i.e., m′i + p
′
i < Bi, with corresponding
utility U ′i , and si is a strategy where follower i invests all its
budget, i.e., mi + pi = Bi, with corresponding utility Ui. For
Case 1 and Case 2, we always have U ′i < Ui.
Proof: We consider Cases 1 and Case 2 separately as
follows:
• Case 1: When the follower only invests p′i < Bi stakes
to the pool, its expected payoff U ′1i is equal to r
p
i in
(5). Now, if the follower invests pi = Bi to the pool,
its payoff can be determined as follows:
U1i =
Bi(1− α)
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R− ce−Bi . (10)
Then, the difference in payoff between the two strate-
gies is
U1i − U ′1i =
(Bi − p′i)(1− α)
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R
+ (ce−p
′
i − ce−Bi),
(11)
which is always positive since p′i < Bi.
• Case 2: When follower i only uses m′i < Bi stakes for
self-mining, its payoff U ′2i is equal to r
m
i in (6). If the
follower self-mines with all its budget, the payoff is
U2i =
Bi
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R− Ci. (12)
The different in payoff is then determined by:
U2i − U ′2i =
Bi −m′i
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R, (13)
which is always positive since m′i < Bi.
Moreover, we prove in the following Lemma that, given
the same stakes to invest, Case 3 always gives a worse
payoff than Case 2, and thus a rational follower will never
choose Case 3.
Lemma 2. Let U2i , U
3
i denote the payoff of Case 2 and Case 3,
respectively. If follower i invests the same β stakes in these two
cases, i.e., m2i = β and m
3
i + p
3
i = β, then Case 2 always gives
a better payoff than Case 3, i.e., U2i > U
3
i ,∀α, c.
Proof: The difference in payoff between Case 2 and 3
can be calculated by
U2i − U3i =
β
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R− Ci
−
(
β − p3i + p3i (1− α)
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R
− Ci − ce−p3i
)
,
=
p3iα
σ +
∑
n∈Np pn +
∑N
j=1mj
R+ ce−p
3
i ,
(14)
which is always positive.
As a result, Case 3 can be removed from the strategy
space of every follower.
In Case 4, the follower receives payoff U4i = 0. Therefore,
if follower i has budget Bi such that r
p
i > 0 or r
m
i > 0,
the follower will invest stakes to the pool or to self-mining,
i.e., switch to Case 1 and 2. If follower i has Bi such that
rpi < 0 and r
m
i < 0, the follower will not participate
in the consensus process, and thus it does not have any
impact on the game. Since the network benefits from user
participation, network parameters such as R should be
designed to encourage stakeholders with small budgets to
participate.
Since Case 3 and Case 4 are eliminated and the strategies
investing less than the budget always give less payoffs in
Case 1 and Case 2, the total network stakes becomes a
constant, i.e.,
σ +
∑
n∈Np
pn +
N∑
j=1
mj = σ +
N∑
i=1
Bi. (15)
Then, the best response of a stakeholder (i.e., follower) can
be determined by Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. A stakeholder’s best response is to invest all stakes
either to invest to the pool or for self-mining.
Proof: Since Case 4 does not have any impact on the
game, it follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 that a rational
stakeholder will use all its budget either to invest to the pool
or for self-mining.
Since p∗i = Bi −m∗i , the best response can be deduced
from either p∗i orm
∗
i . Therefore, from now on, we can denote
the best response of follower i by the number of stakes it
invest to the pool p∗i . Then, the best response p
∗
i of follower
i can be expressed as a function of the pool’s cost and fee as
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follows
p∗i (α, c) =

0 if Ci <
BiαR
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi ,
Bi if Ci ≥ BiαR
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi .
(16)
Theorem 4. Given a strategy of the leader, there exists an optimal
strategy for every follower and this strategy is unique.
Proof: From (16), it can be seen that for every fixed
strategy of the leader, a unique best response of every
follower can be straightforwardly determined.
4.2.2 Leader strategy
The backward induction mechanism [28] can be used to
find the best strategy of the leader, which is the strategy
that yields the highest payoff given the best responses of all
followers, i.e., we have
s∗p = argmax
sp=(c,α)
Up(sp, p
∗
i ) =
σ
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
R+
∑
i∈Np
(
p∗iα
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
R+ ce−Bi
)
.
(17)
Since the total network stakes can be considered a
constant, the profit from the pool owner’s stake is also
a constant (the first term in (17)) and does not need to
be optimized. Moreover, since p∗i (α, c) can only take two
values, i.e., 0 or Bi, it can be represented by a binary
decision variable xi ∈ x = {x1, . . . , xN}, such that when
xi = 1, p∗i = Bi and when xi = 0, p
∗
i = 0. This helps
to transform the optimization problem (17) into a Mixed-
Integer Programming (MIP) optimization as follows:
max
α,c,x
N∑
i=1
xi
(
BiRα
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi
)
,
s.t.
BiRα
σ +
∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi ≤ L(1− xi) + Ci ∀i ∈ N ,
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N ,
(18)
where L is a sufficiently large number. The goal of (18)
is to find the optimal values of (α, c,x) to maximize the
pool’s profit. The objective function represents the profit
of the pool, where the stake pool can only charge the
stakeholders who have invested in the pool. The first set of
constraints ensures that only when the pool charges follower
i less than Ci, xi can take the value of 1, and thus the
profit can be added to the total profit of the pool. The
second set of constraints ensures that every xi is a binary
number. However, the objective function is nonlinear, i.e., it
contains a multiplication of two decision variables xi and
α, which makes it much more complex to solve [30]. Thus,
we transform (18) into an equivalent Mixed-Integer Linear
Programming (MILP) model as follows:
max
α,c,x,y
N∑
i=1
yi,
s.t.
BiRα∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi ≤ L(1− xi) + Ci ∀i ∈ N ,
yi − Lxi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N ,
yi − L(1− xi) ≤ BiRα∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi ∀i ∈ N ,
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N ,
yi ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ N .
(19)
The transformation from (18) to (19) is done by a stan-
dard transformation technique which ensures the equiva-
lence of the two models [29]. In particular, we introduce a
new set of continuous variables y = {y1, . . . , yN} which
represents the profit which the pool can yield from follower
i. Two new sets of auxiliary constraints, i.e., the second and
third sets of constraints, are added to set the upper bound
for yi. If xi = 0, i.e., follower i does not invest stakes to
the pool, yi will be upper-bounded by 0. If xi = 1, yi will
be upper-bounded by
BiRα∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi . Thus, the optimal
solution of (19) consists of two optimal values of α and c as
shown in (17).
4.2.3 Existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium
The existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium is proven via
the existence of the optimal solutions of (19) in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 5. There exists at least one Stackelberg equilibrium in
the considered stake pool game.
Proof: We prove that there exists at least one solution
of (19). This means that there exists at least one leader’s
optimal strategy. Since only the decision variable xi is a
binary number in (19), if we fix the value of xi,∀i ∈ N , (19)
becomes a Linear Programming (LP) problem. By fixing the
value of xi, we can decompose (19) into 2N LP problems
(there are 2N different combinations of xi’s values). Each
LP problem has the form of (19), except that all xi are
constants instead of decision variables. In the LP problem
where
∑N
i xi = 0, the optimal objective value is 0. In
each of the remaining LP problems, the feasible region is
constrained by
BiRα∑N
j=1Bj
+ ce−Bi = Ci,∀i ∈ Np. (20)
Since α, c ≥ 0, the feasible region is bounded as illustrated
in Fig. 4. As a result, each of these 2N LP problems has at
least one optimal solution [30].
Since these 2N LP problems enumerate all possible
combinations of xi and each of these LP has at least one
optimal solution, there exists at least one optimal solution
of the MILP. Moreover, the existence of the best response
of every follower is proven in Theorem 4. Therefore, there
exists at least one Stackelberg equilibrium (U∗p , U
∗
i ) with the
corresponding Stackelberg solution (s∗p, s
∗
i ) in this game.
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Fig. 4: An illustration of a bounded LP’s feasible region.
4.2.4 Uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium
Although there always exists at least one Stackelberg equi-
librium in this game, the uniqueness of the equilibrium
cannot be guaranteed because both α and c are continuous
variables. Consequently, there may be multiple pairs of α
and c to achieve the same optimal utility as will be shown
later in Section 5. In the conventional Stackelberg game
model, the leader has only one primary priority, that is,
to maximize the profit. Therefore, we propose a secondary
priority for the leader, which is to minimize α. This serves
two purposes, i.e., to attract followers with high stakes (as
the amount the pool charges via the fee is proportional to
the stakes) and to determine the unique optimal strategy
for the game (i.e., the unique optimal strategy for both the
leader and followers). Under the proposed approach, we
can always obtain the unique Stackelberg equilibrium that
has the lowest fee among the Stackelberg equilibria.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Parameter Settings
We first study three small game instances, i.e., G1 to G3,
to clearly show the relation between the leader and the
followers in different situations. In G1, we consider a small
game consisting one stakeholder and one stake pool with
C1 = 0.1, b1 = 5, R = 10, and σ = 10. Then, we extend
this game to G2 by considering five followers with the
same configurations as that of the follower in G1, while
other parameters are unchanged. After that, we consider
game G3. Parameters are similar as those of G2 except that
the followers have different budgets B = (5, 10, 13, 6, 8),
operational costs C = (0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.6, 0.5), and R = 50.
To evaluate more general cases, we simulate 13 instances
G4 to G16, each with 1,000 followers and different parameters
as shown in Table 3. Among them, the first five games G4
to G8 are simulated with network parameters, such as R,
C, and B, generated based on several real-world PoS-based
blockchain networks [31], [32], [33], [34], [35]. The follower’s
stakes and operational costs are generated randomly with
normal distribution in the ranges listed in Table 3. The
(a) Best response function of follower 1
(b) Profit of follower 1
(c) Pool’s profit
Fig. 5: Profit and best response of the leader and follower in
G1.
results, including the optimal leader strategy, optimal profit,
and percentage of the network stakes invested in the pool,
are obtained by solving the MILP optimization (19).
5.2 Numerical Results
5.2.1 Small Cases
The best response function of follower 1 in G1 is illustrated
in Fig. 5(a). Based on its best response, the profit of follower
1 can be determined. In this game, the profit of the follower
decreases as the pool’s fee and cost increase as shown in
Fig. 5(b), but it is still higher than self-mining. The profit
of the pool is illustrated in Fig. 5(c). Since there is only
one follower in G1, the profit of the pool only comes from
follower 1, and thus it is upper-bounded by C1. In this
game, any pair of (c, α) that satisfies
αRBi
σ + Ci
+ ce−Bi =
Ci =
50
15
α + 0.007c = 0.1 is a Stackelberg solution, which
leads to multiple Stackelberg equilibria. Nevertheless, under
our proposed approach, we can find the unique Stackelberg
equilibrium for this game at (c∗, α∗) = (14.8, 0).
In G2, since the followers have the same budgets and
operational costs, their best response and profit functions
are the same, which are illustrated in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b),
respectively. These functions are similar to that of G1, except
that the fee threshold is higher (7%). This is because there are
more followers in G2, and thus (c, α) must satisfy αRBi
σ + Ci
+
ce−Bi = Ci =
50
35
α + 0.007c = 0.1. The pool’s profit in G2
is illustrated in Fig. 6(c), which is upper-bounded by 5Ci in
12
TABLE 3: Parameters and results of 13 simulation instances.
G Parameters Stackelberg equilibriumR B range C range σ Based on c∗ α∗(%) U∗p % stake of the pool
4 1000 [1,250] [0.05,0.1] 1000 Cardano [31] 3.2 4.0 28.95 69.5
5 200 [1,1000] [0.0001,0.15] 1000 Algorand [32] 0.06 1.6 1.81 56.6
6 3.81 [1,400] [0.0001,0.002] 1000 Cosmos [33] 0.1 14.4 0.35 61.2
7 78 [80,160] [0.0001,0.02] 1000 Tezos [34] 40.1 6.1 2.29 48.9
8 500 [1,5000] [0.001,0.3] 1000 NEM [35] 0.003 13.01 40.92 62.9
9 100 [1,250] [0.05,0.1] 1000 Cardano 0.003 40.4 28.08 69.5
10 10000 [1,250] [0.05,0.1] 1000 Cardano 0.207 0.4 29.13 69.5
11 1000 [1,250] [0.01,0.02] 1000 Cardano 0.04 0.8 5.82 69.5
12 1000 [1,250] [0.25,0.5] 1000 Cardano 0.04 20.5 140.54 69.5
13 1000 [1,25] [0.05,0.1] 1000 Cardano 0.2 4.7 36.51 72.1
14 1000 [1,2500] [0.05,0.1] 1000 Cardano 356.1 4.0 28.21 70.1
15 1000 [1,250] [0.05,0.1] 1 Cardano 0.04 4.0 28.31 69.5
16 1000 [1,250] [0.05,0.1] 100000 Cardano 0.02 10.9 28.15 69.5
(a) Best response function of follower 1
(b) Profit of follower 1
(c) Pool’s profit
Fig. 6: Profit and best response of the leader and follower in
G2.
this game. The unique proposed equilibrium of this game
has a corresponding solution (c∗, α∗) = (14.8, 0) as shown
in Fig. 6(c).
In G3, each follower’s best response is illustrated in 7(a).
Typically, the higher a follower’s budget is, the higher cost
and the lower fee that follower is willing to accept, and vice
versa. For example, follower 3 with the highest budget only
accepts a fee of no more than 1.6%, and follower 1 with
the lowest budget only accepts a cost lower than 15. This
is because the budget is proportional to the fee the pool
charges, while the cost decreases exponentially as the bud-
(a) Best responses of followers
(b) Pool’s total profit
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(c) Pool’s profit from each follower
Fig. 7: Profit and best response of the leader and followers
in G3.
get increases. The pool’s profit in G3 is illustrated in Fig. 7(b),
with the leader’s optimal strategy (c∗, α∗) = (171.3, 3.0%)
and optimal profit U∗p = 1.19. Fig. 7(c) illustrates the profit
the pool receives from each follower. Interestingly, at the
obtained Stackelberg equilibrium of G3, the follower with
the highest stake, i.e, follower 3, does not invest to the
pool. The reason is that follower 3 has a relatively low
operational cost, and thus the follower is more inclined to
mine if the pool’s cost and fee are too high. If the pool tries
to incentivize all followers to invest by reducing α and c, its
profit is only Up = 0.68.
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5.2.2 General Cases
The results of more general cases are shown in Table 3.
The five instances G4 to G8 are simulated with parameters
adopted from several real-world blockchain networks [31],
[32], [33], [34], [35]. The results show that the leader’s op-
timal strategy and profit are significantly influenced by the
network’s parameters. For example, we obtain the optimal
solution of G4 where (c∗, α∗) = (3.2, 4.0%), U∗p = 28.95, and
approximately 69.5% of the total network’s stakes (including
σ) are invested to the pool. The profit that the pool earns
from each follower depends on each follower’s budget and
operational cost, as shown in Fig. 8. Typically, a follower
with higher cost and budget can give the pool more profit.
However, similar to G3, if the budget is too high, the
follower might not want to invest stakes to the pool, e.g.,
the followers with budget Bi greater than 150 do not join
the pool in G4.
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Fig. 8: Pool’s profit from each follower in G4.
5.2.3 Impacts of Parameters
The last eight games G9 to G16 are simulated to study the
impacts of important parameters R, B, c, and σ, on the
game’s outcome. The impacts of those parameters are briefly
described as follows:
• Block reward R: G9 and G10 are simulated to show
the impact of R. As R increases, the pool’s profit
increases. However, the followers’ operational costs
are constant. Therefore, the pool has to decrease α
when R increases, otherwise the followers will self-
mine.
• Operational costs C: G11 and G12 show how the fol-
lowers’ operational cost impacts the game’s outcome.
As the C increase, the pool can increase its profit by
increasing α. The reason is that the followers’ profits
from self-mining are inversely proportional to the C,
and thus self-mining becomes less profitable if C are
too high.
• Budgets B: G13 and G14 show that as the budgets
of followers increase, the pool can increase c but it
has to reduce α. This is because the profit the pool
receives via α is proportional to B, while the profit
the pool gets from c decreases exponentially as B
increase. Moreover, as B increase, the stakeholders
invest fewer stakes to the pool and consequently the
pool’s profit decreases. The reason is that when B
increase, the profit from self-mining also increases,
and thus the followers prefer to self-mine.
• The pool owner’s stake σ: The last two games show
that as σ increases, although there are more stakes
invested in the pool, its profit slightly decreases.
The reason is that σ is inversely proportional to the
pool’s profit from each follower, and thus increasing
σ means that the pool charges less from each fol-
lower. Consequently, the pool’s profit decreases even
though more followers invest to the pool.
5.3 Summary of Findings
The key findings of the considered stake pool game are
summarized as follows:
• We have proved that for a rational stakeholder, its
best strategy is to invest all stakes from its budget to
the blockchain network.
• We have proved that for each stakeholder, its best
strategy is to invest all its stakes either to the pool or
for self-mining.
• We have proposed an approach for the leader to
decide its optimal strategy. Under this approach,
there always exists the optimal and unique best
strategies for the stakeholders and the stake pool
owner. This approach also helps the stake pool to
attract stakeholders with high stakes.
6 CONCLUSION
To address the problem of roaming fraud for mobile ser-
vice providers, we have proposed BlockRoam, a novel
blockchain-based roaming management system which con-
sists of our thoroughly analyzed PoS consensus mecha-
nism and a smart-contract-enabled roaming management
platform. Moreover, we have analyzed and showed that
BlockRoam’s security and performance can be enhanced
by incentivizing more users to participate in the network.
Therefore, we have developed an economic model based
on Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profits of
network users, thereby incentivizing their participation. We
have analyzed and determined the best strategies for the
stakeholders and the stake pool. We have also proposed an
effective solution that results in a unique equilibrium for our
economic model. Lastly, we have evaluated the impacts of
important parameters on the strategies and the equilibrium
of the game. The proposed economic model can help the
mobile service providers to earn additional profits, attract
more investment to the blockchain network, and enhance
the network’s security and performance.
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